The UK Government has confirmed that Carbon Price Support (CPS) will be abolished from April 2028, marking a notable adjustment in the UK’s carbon pricing framework and raising questions about whether the move is primarily a technical correction or a politically timed intervention amid rising energy pressures.
Announced in Parliament by Dan Tomlinson, Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, the decision ends a levy first introduced in 2013 to reinforce the carbon price faced by electricity generators beyond the level set by the UK Emissions Trading Scheme.
At its core, the Government’s argument is straightforward: CPS has achieved its original purpose. Coal has effectively been eliminated from the UK power system, and the ETS has matured into a tighter, market-based mechanism that already drives emissions reductions. In that sense, maintaining an additional tax on top of the ETS is increasingly difficult to justify on efficiency grounds.
Economically, this reform corrects a long-standing inconsistency. CPS imposed a separate and higher carbon cost on electricity generation, while other emissions sources—such as domestic gas use—were not subject to equivalent charges. This created distortions in how emissions reductions were achieved, often pushing the system towards more expensive abatement options. Removing CPS therefore simplifies the architecture of carbon pricing and allows the ETS to function more as originally intended: as a single, economy-wide mechanism for delivering least-cost emissions reductions.
Importantly, total emissions are not expected to rise. Because the ETS operates under a fixed cap, any increase in emissions from electricity generation would be offset by reductions elsewhere in the system. The change is therefore more about efficiency and distribution of costs than about overall environmental outcomes.
However, the timing and framing of the decision suggest a broader political dimension. The UK is once again facing upward pressure on energy prices, shaped in part by geopolitical instability linked to the Iran conflict and wider energy market volatility. Against this backdrop, reducing visible costs on electricity bills provides a clear and immediate political benefit, even if the direct impact on household bills is relatively modest.
The reform also sits comfortably within a wider policy narrative. It supports the Government’s British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme, which aims to reduce electricity costs for energy-intensive industries, and aligns with the broader objective of delivering “clean power” while managing affordability concerns.
Seen in this light, the decision is best understood as a blend of policy correction and political timing. On one hand, it removes a distortion that economists have long criticised and improves the coherence of the UK’s carbon pricing system. On the other, it responds to immediate pressure to ease energy costs and demonstrate action in a sensitive economic environment.
Yet the reform is also limited in scope. While CPS is being removed, the broader carbon pricing landscape remains fragmented, with significant variation in how different sectors are taxed for emissions. This suggests that the move is not part of a full restructuring, but rather a targeted adjustment—removing one of the more visible and politically exposed elements of the system.
Ultimately, the abolition of CPS reflects a familiar policy pattern: economically defensible reform accelerated and shaped by political and economic pressure. It improves efficiency at the margin, but stops short of resolving the deeper inconsistencies in the UK’s approach to carbon taxation.
